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UNITED STATES v. DANN: WHAT IT PORTENDS FOR
OWNERSHIP OF MILLIONS OF ACRES IN THE
WESTERN UNITED STATES
Kristine L. Foot
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Dann," the government brought a trespass action
against two Western Shoshone Indians, Mary and Carrie Dann, for
violating the Taylor Grazing Act' by grazing their livestock on public land
without a permit. The Danns defended their actions by asserting that their
tribe retained aboriginal title3 to the disputed lands. The government
countered, contending that the Western Shoshone's title to the land had
been conclusively extinguished in proceedings before the Indian Claims
Commission (ICC).4 Although compensation for the taking of the land had
been appropriated and credited to an interest-bearing account in the
Tribe's name,5 the Dann court held that "payment" had not been made.
The court's definition of "payment" under the Indian Claims Act could
potentially affect title to twelve million acres in Eastern Nevada.6 Title to
other lands for which funds have been appropriated by the ICC, but not
distributed to the aboriginal owners, may also be affected. Additionally,
the Dann decision suggests that Indian tribes can defend their title by
asserting that inclusion of Indian lands in a Taylor Grazing district does
not extinguish title.
II. BACKGROUND
In August of 1951 the Temoak Band of Western Shoshone Indians
filed a petition with the ICC on behalf of the Western Bands of the
1. 706 F.2d 919 (9th Cir. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Dann I1].
2. 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1976) and related regulations found at 43 C.F.R. § 4100 (1981).
3. "Aboriginal title is a right of occupancy arising from exclusive aboriginal possession of land,
and it is valid against all parties until it is 'extinguished' by the United States." Dann II, 706 F.2d at
922. In Dann , the federal government admitted the historic existence of aboriginal title. The pre-trial
order stipulated that in 1848 the disputed lands "were part of a vast area exclusively used and occupied
by the Western Shoshone." Id. at 933 n.10.
4. The Commission was created in 1946 when Congress enacted the Indian Claim Commission
Act. 25 U.S.C. §§ 70-70w (1976). The Commission was empowered to hear and decide claims made by
Indian tribes against the United States, including "claims arising from the taking of the United States,
whether as a result of treaty of cession or otherwise, of lands owned or occupied by the claimant without
. . . payment . . . or compensation." 25 U.S.C. § 70a (1976).
5. Appropriation was a routine legislative step. Dann 11, 706 F.2d at 926, citing House Comm. on
Appropriations, Report on Supplemental Appropriations Bill of 1978, H.R. REP. No. 644,95th Cong.,
1st Sess. 53 (1977).
6. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 922.
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Shoshone Nation alleging that the United States government had taken
large tracts of tribal land in Nevada and California without compensating
the Indians.7 Eleven years later the ICC decided that the Indians held
aboriginal title to 24,396,403 acres.8 Of that total, the title to the 2,184,650
acres located in California was found to have been extinguished in March
of 1853.9 The date of taking of the Nevada acreage was less clear, as it
occurred over time through the "gradual encroachment by whites, settlers
and others, and the acquisition, disposition or taking of [Indian] lands by
the United States for its own use and benefit, or the use and benefit of its
citizens ... -10 The parties stipulated in 1966 that the date of taking of
the 22,211,753 acres situated in Nevada was July 1, 1872.11 In 1972 the
ICC awarded the Indians $21,550,000 for the stipulated taking of their
lands.1 2
Twenty-three years after the original claim was filed, but before the
ICC award had been distributed, another group of Western Shoshone
(which included the Danns) petitioned the ICC to stay its proceedings and
allow them to intervene. They desired to file an amended claim alleging
that aboriginal title had not been extinguished to twelve million acres of
Nevada land.1 The intervention was not allowed, primarily because it was
attempted at such a late stage of the proceedings.14 The United States
Court of Claims affirmed the ICC's ruling, noting that the attempted
intervention appeared to be an intratribal disagreement over the proper
litigation strategy.' 5
The Temoak Band changed its strategy in 1976 and adopted the
position advanced by the intervenors." The Temoak Band petitioned the
7. Western Shoshone Legal Defense and Education Association v. United States, 531 F.2d 495,
496 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 885 (1976).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 497.
12. Id.
13. Id. The intervenors feared that if the claim was paid, future attempts to litigate the title to
these lands would be barred under 25 U.S.C. § 70u (1976). Id.
14. Id. at 499. On appeal, the United States Court of Claims in Temoak Band of Western
Shoshone Indians v. United States, 493 F.2d 994 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973-996 (1979)
stated: "We hold that far too much water had gone under the bridge even in 1974; we think the
Commission effectuated the will of Congress more perfectly by allowing this case to come to final
judgment ..."
15. Temoak Band of Western Shoshone Indians, 593 F.2d at 996:
The desire of the Indians to make the water flow back under the bridge is explained as a
natural reaction to a visible change in legal climate, where Indian claims to own large tracts
are reported in litigation or settled favorably to them, whereas, they say, in 1946 the pursuit
of a money award ...seemed the only hope for justice.
16. The Temoak Band asserted that its original decision to seek compensation for the land did
not constitute an election of remedies because the Commission had no jurisdiction to quiet title.
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Secretary of Interior for an administrative declaration that the Western
Shoshone still held title to twelve million acres in Nevada. 17 Pending the
Secretary's determination, the Indians asked the ICC to stay its claim
proceedings.18 The stay was denied and the ICC entered its final award.1'9
After all avenues of judicial review had been exhausted, the Clerk of the
Court of Claims certified the award to the General Accounting Office for
payment.2
In Dann, the district court concluded that aboriginal title had been
extinguished by the ICC's actions, and entered summary judgment for the
government in the trespass action.21 On appeal, the Court of Claims held
that title to the disputed lands had not yet been litigated, noting that the
ICC's actions were grounded on a stipulated taking date.22 On remand, the
district court enjoined the Danns from further trespass, but denied the
government damages for the Indians' trespasses that preceded the certifi-
cation of the claims award.23 Both sides appealed this decision. 2
III. THE DETERMINATIVE ISsuE: HAD THE CLAIM BEEN PAID?
The Indian Claims Act provides for congressional appropriation of
the amount necessary to pay the Commission's final award determination.
Such payment fully discharges the United States from liability for all
claims and demands touching any of the controverted matters.25
In United States v. Dann, the government argued that the Act barred
the Western Shoshone from asserting that they still held aboriginal title to
the disputed lands.2 ' The Indians contended that their title had not been
extinguished as none of the appropriated money had yet been distributed to
Furthermore, neither equitable nor declaratory relief was available against thegovernment until 1976,
when Congress amended the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703 (1976), to waive
sovereign immunity. United States v. Dann, 572 F.2d 222,227 n.3 (9th Cir. 1978) [hereinafter cited as
Dann 1].
17. Dann I, 572 F.2d at 225..
18. Id.
19. Dann I1, 706 F.2d at 923. The Court of Claims noted: "We think it is only Congress that
could stay and undo the course of litigation .... The essential point of the matter is that the Temoak's
true appeal is to legislative grace, not as of right to this court." Id., citing Temoak Band, 593 F.2d at
999. See supra notes 14 & 15.
20. Both the Indians and the United States appealed the Commission's denial of the stay. The
Court of Claims affirmed the Commission's award, holding that it was too late for such a major shift in
litigation strategy. The Supreme Court denied certiorari. Dann 1, 572 F.2d at 225.
21. Dann 11, 706 F.2d at 923.
22. Id., citing Dann I, 572 F.2d at 226.
23. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 923.
24. Id.
25. 25 U.S.C. § 70u (1976).
26. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 924.
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the Western Shoshone or used for their benefit.2"
The indefiniteness of the language of the Indian Claims Act forms the
core of the Dann decision. The Dann court had to discern whether payment
occurred at the time of appropriation or at the time of distribution.
To resolve this issue, the court looked to the applicable rules of
statutory construction.2 Indian treaties are to be construed as they were
understood by the tribal members who participated in the negotiation
process.29 Treaties are to be liberally interpreted so their protective
purposes can be accomplished. Ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of
the Indians.30 These sympathetic rules of construction of Indian treaties
have been applied to statutes which address Indian concerns."1
Guided by these precepts, the Dann court considered the ordinary
meaning of "payment." Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1407 (1976),
appropriated monies could not be distributed or used until the Secretary of
Interior had prepared a plan of use and Congress had approved it, or until
separate legislation was passed. In the instant case, the Secretary did not
submit such a plan within the statutory timeframe.32 Since more than one
year had passed since the appropriation of the funds, separate legislation
would be required to free the monies.33 In light of these "significant legal
blocks,"3 4 the court concluded that "payment" had not yet occurred.35
The court's holding was influenced by assurances made by the Court
of Claims to the Indians concerning litigation of title to the disputed lands.
In denying the intervenors' petition for a stay of the ICC proceedings, the
Court of Claims noted that the title issue was not necessarily foreclosed by
the claim proceedings: "[T] he bar. . . does not fall until payment. . . .If
the majority of the Identifiable Group wishes to postpone payment, in order
to try out the issue of current title, it can, of course, ask Congress to delay
making the appropriation and direction which will be necessary to pay the
award."' 8
This recourse to Congress was affected by a 1978 amendment which
included Indian claim awards in the standing appropriations act. 7 Since
no separate appropriation by Congress is now required, the Indians are
27. Id. at 926.
28. The court analyzed the "ordinary meaning of 'payment.'" Dann II, 706 F.2d at 926.
29. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942).
30. Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930).
31. Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918).
32. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 926.
33. 25 U.S.C. § 1402 (1976).
34. Dann 1I, 706 F.2d at 926.
35. Id.
36. Western Shoshone Legal Defense and Education Association, 531 F.2d at 503 n.16.
37. Act of Mar. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-240,92 Stat. 107, 116 (1978) and Act of May 4, 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-26, 91 Stat. 61, 96 (1977).
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precluded from petitioning Congress to delay making the appropriation so
that title can be litigated. The Court of Claims maneuvered around the
amendment's potential effect on the Indians' title rights by holding that
while payment could take place in the absence of congressional action,
Congress could still intervene "to permit collateral pursuit of the Western
Shoshone claims to continuing aboriginal title."38
Faced with the 1978 amendment calling for automatic appropriation,
but cognizant of Indian reliance on the old law, the Dann court struck a
middleground: until distribution of an award has been made, "payment"
has not occurred.39 Further, even if actual payment has been made,
Congress can still intervene to allow title litigation.40
IV. ANALYSIS
The Dann's key contention was that the Western Shoshone still held
aboriginal title to twelve million acres of land in Eastern Nevada. The
question of whether payment had been made through congressional
appropriation of the Commission's award was determinative in the Dann
case, but would have been virtually meaningless had the court accepted the
government's theory that the Indians' title to the disputed lands had
previously been extinguished by application of public laws, creation of a
reservation, or inclusion of the land in a grazing district.4 1
The language of the public laws, when read in the light of the general
rule that congressional intent to extinguish aboriginal title must be clearly
indicated,42 formed the basis for the court's determination that those laws
did not act to extinguish Indian title.
The court first examined the application of the homestead laws43 to
the aboriginally held lands in light of the Preemptive Act" and its interplay
with the Treaty of Ruby Valley of 1863." Lands to which aboriginal title
38. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 927.
39. Id. at 925-27.
40. Id. at 927, relying on Temoak Band, 593 F.2d at 999.
41. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 928.
42. See Wilkinson and Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as
Water Flows, or Grass Grows upon the Earth"--How Long a Time is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601
(1975).
43. Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862) (repealed 1976).
44. Act of July 2, 1862, ch. 79, 12 Stat. 503 (1862).
45. Treaty of Ruby Valley, 18 Stat. 689 (1863). The Western Shoshone Tribe's aboriginal lands
were incorporated into the United States from Mexico by the Treqty of guadalupe Hidalgo, 9 Stat. 922
(1948). In 1862, a special commission was created to negotiate a peace treaty with the Indians. The
commission was instructed "that they were not expected to negotiate for the extinction of the Indian
title. . ." Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 347 (1945). Five
separate treaties were signed, but the Treaty 9f Ruly Valley is the only one directly involved in the
Dann case. Dann I, 572 F.2d at 224.
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was still intact were excepted from the provisions of the Preemption Act,40
which gave a settler on public lands a preferential right to buy his claim.47
When the preemption law was repealed in 1891, the homestead laws
touched all "unappropriated public lands. 48 Indian lands were once again
excepted. Disposition of Indian lands was to continue in accordance with
treaty provisions.49 The Treaty of Ruby Valley opened the lands in
question to exploration for gold and to mines, mills, ranches and agricul-
tural settlements.5 0 The court ruled that this piecemeal provision did not
encompass all of the Shoshone's land: "[A]ny loss of territory is only so
large as the incursion requires, and the Shoshone retain the rest." 51 In sum,
the court found no clear expression of congressional intent to extinguish the
Shoshone's title to all of their lands. Only the aboriginal title to the land
actually granted as homesteads was lost.52
The government's second argument was that aboriginal title had been
extinguished by the creation of the Duck Valley Reservation in 1877."3 The
Dann court examined the government's actions on two fronts: first in light
of the Treaty of Ruby Valley, then with a view towards the power of
Congress to take such action. In Article VI of the Treaty the Shoshone
agreed that they would become a sedentary, agricultural people whenever
the President deemed it expedient to place them on a reservation created
within the aboriginal territory. However, Article VI was not satisfied as the
Duck Valley Reservation was not located on the Indians' ancestral lands.5
The court did not question that Congress had the power to extinguish the
Indians' title, regardless of the reservation's location, but held that
Congress had not demonstrated the requisite intent to extinguish title since
it had not acted consistently with the Treaty's provisions. 5
46. Act of Juhe 22, 1838, ch. 119, 5 Stat. 251 (1838).
47. P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 219-247 (1979).
48. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 561, § 5, 26 Stat. 1095, 1098 (1891).
49. Id. at § 10, 26 Stat. at 1099. A prospective Preemption Act was enacted in 1841. This Act
expressly proscribed settlement on public lands to which Indian title had not been extinguished. Act of
Sept. 4, 1841, ch. 16, § 10, 5 Stat. 453, 455 (1891).
50. Treaty of Ruby Valley, 18 Stat. at 690, Art. IV.
51. Dann 11, 706 F.2d at 930.
52. Id.
53. The Duck Valley Reservation was created by Executive Order on April 16, 1877. Dann II,
706 F.2d at 930, citing I C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS AND TREATIES 866 (2d ed. 1904).
54. Dann 1I, 706 F.2d at 930. The government believed for many years that the reservation was
within the described territories. Id.
55. Id. at 931, relying on United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad, 314 U.S. 339 (1941). In
Santa Fe, the court held that the creation of the Colorado River reservation was merely an offer to the
Walapais and other tribes to abandon their ancestral homes. The Walapais originally declined, but
later petitioned Congress for a reservation. This petition demonstrated the Indians' intent to leave their
land. The creation of the requested reservation indicated the government's intent to extinguish
aboriginal title. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 353-358.
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Finally, the government urged that aboriginal title had been extin-
guished by inclusion of the disputed lands in the Elko Grazing District,
established under the Taylor Grazing Act.56 The first prong of this
argument was that a grazing district should be considered to be one large
ranch.57 The Treaty of Ruby Valley allowed for the establishment of
ranches within the treatied lands,58 with such establishment working a loss
of aboriginal title. 9 The court rejected this questionable construction
because "doubtful expressions, instead of being resolved in favor of the
United States, are to be resolved in favor of a weak and defenseless people,
who are wards of the nation, and dependent wholly upon its protection and
good faith."60
The government's second prong analogized the inclusion of aboriginal
lands in a grazing district to the inclusion of such lands in a national
forest.61 In United States v. Gemnill,6" 2 inclusion of Indian lands in a
national forest was held to extinguish aboriginal title.6" However, the
Gemmill Indians had been forcibly expelled from their land in the 1850's
and were subsequently compensated for the loss of it." Taken together, the
facts in Gemmill were indicative of congressional intent to extinguish
aboriginal title. In Dann, the court held that this intent could not be
gleaned from the mere inclusion of the Indian lands in a grazing district."
In striking down each of the government's theories, the Dann court
avoided destruction of treaty rights because there was room for doubt as to
56. 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1976). Under this Act, the Secretary of Interior was empowered "to
establish grazing districts ... of vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved lands from any part of the
public domain of the United States. . ., which are not in national forests, [or] Indian reservations.
and which in his opinion are chiefly valuable for grazing and raising forage crops." Id.
57. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 931.
58. 18 Stat. at 690, Article IV.
59. Dann 11, 706 F.2d at 930.
60. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912). This statement simply expands on the Dann
court's shorthand expression that "doubtful terms are to be construed in favor of the Indians." Dann II,
706 F.2d at 932.
61. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 932.
62. 535 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 982 (1976).
63. Id. at 1149.
64. Id. at 1148-49.
65. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 933. The Dann court also distinguished the single use of a grazing
district from the multiple uses made of national forests. Id. at 932. More importantly, the court
questioned whether aboriginally held lands could be brought under the provisions of the Taylor
Grazing Act as "unappropriated lands." Id. Historically, Indian lands have not been considered part of
the public domain. The Northwest Ordinance provided for surveying of those lands "in which the titles
of Indians have been extinguished." Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, § 1,1 Stat. 464, 465 (1796). Almost a
century later, the Preemption Act was passed. It expressly proscribed settlement on public lands to
which Indian title had not been extinguished. Act of Sept. 4,184 1, ch. 16, § 10, 5 Stat. 453,455 (1891).
The Dann court could have buttressed its decision and strengthened the Indians' position with the clear
language of these Acts.
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congressional intent. The holding is in harmony with precedent. 6 The trust
relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes weighs
heavily against implied abrogation of treaties: "[A]n extinguishment
cannot be lightly implied in view of the avowed solicitude of the Federal
Government for the welfare of its Indian wards."81 7
V. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Dann, a simple trespass action against two
Western Shoshone Indians expanded into a dispute involving title to
approximately twelve million acres in Eastern Nevada.68 The government
contended that aboriginal title had been extinguished as a matter of law by
the application of the public land laws, creation of a reservation, and
inclusion of the disputed lands in a grazing district.69 Each of these theories
fell under the weight of the well-established rule that, absent a clear
showing of congressional intent, aboriginal title will not be extinguished.70
This holding makes it clear that Indian tribes can strongly contend that
application of the public land laws does not work an extinguishment of
aboriginal title.
If the court had accepted any one of the government's theories, the
question of whether payment had been made would have been rendered
moot. The payment question became determinative in Dann only because
the Indians' title to the disputed land was found not to have been
extinguished as a matter of law, contrary to the urgings of the
government. 71
The possibility of litigating title to the disputed lands would have been
similarly foreclosed if the court had held that payment had been made
based on the stipulated taking date.72 However, guided by sympathetic
rules of statutory construction, the court held that even though funds had
been placed in an interest-bearing trust fund for the Shoshone, the
significant legal obstacles in the path of distribution or use of these monies
precluded a finding that appropriation amounted to payment. 73
On remand to the district court, the final questions which must be
answered are whether aboriginal title had been preserved to the date of
trial and, if so, whether the Danns share in that title. 74 The determination
66. See Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 414 (1968).
67. Santa Fe, 314 U.S. at 355.
68. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 922.
69. Id. at 928.
70. Id. at 929. See supra notes 42 & 59.
71. Id. at 933.
72. 25 U.S.C. § 70u (1976).
73. Dann II, 706 F.2d at 926.
74. Id. at
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of these issues will ultimately decide the ownership of twelve million acres
of Eastern Nevada land.

